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• If  a taxpayer identifies a transaction as a hedging
transaction, and it is not a hedge, gains from the transaction
are ordinary but losses are capital losses.22
• In the event a transaction meets the definitions of a
hedge but it is not identified as a hedge, gains from the
transaction are nonetheless ordinary and losses are capital
losses.23
Thus, compliance with the regulations has been made
the exclusive way to receive treatment as a hedge.  That
result has been criticized.24
Treatment as a "regulated futures contract"
Positions in "regulated" futures contracts are subject to
the "marked-to-market" rules and are treated as if sold on
the last day of the year.25  Gains or losses arising from those
calculations are treated as if they were 60 percent long-term
and 40 percent short-term without regard to the actual
holding period.26  Hedging transactions are exempt from
these rules.27
It would appear that hedge-to-arrive contracts are not
"regulated futures contracts."28  A regulated futures contract
must be "traded on or subject to the rules of a qualified
board or exchange."29  Hedge-to-arrive contracts appear to
have been outside the ambit of regulated futures activity.30
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
27.03[8][d](1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
4.02[6] (1996).  See also Harl, "Hazards of Hedge-To-
Arrive Contracts," 7 Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1996).
2 See 4 Harl, supra n. 1, § 27.03[8][d]; Harl supra n. 1, §
4.02[6].
3 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b) (defines hedges which
produce ordinary losses).  See also I.R.C. §§ 1092(e),
1256(e)(i).
4 See, e.g. MacAdam v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.  1991-410.
5 I.R.C.§ 1211(b).
6 I.R.C. § 1212 (h).
7 I.R.C. § 1212(a).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(b).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(e)(3).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(d).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(c).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(a)(1).
16 Id.
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(e)(6).
18 Id.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(e)(7).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(e).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(e)(1). The identification must be
made “substantially contemporaneously” with entering
into the hedge. An identification does not meet that test
if made more than 35 days after entering into the
h dging transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(e)(2)(ii).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(f)(i).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(f)(2)(iii).
24 See Schmidt, "The Hedging Rules: Clarity or
Confusion?" 68 Tax Notes 1169 (Aug. 26, 1996).
25 I.R.C. § 1256(a)(1).
26 I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3).
27 I.R.C. § 1256(e)(1).
28 See I.R.C. § 1256(g)(1)(B).
29 Id.
30 See Harl, "Hazards of Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts," 7
Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1996).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
CATTLE . A veterinarian informed the state police that
neglected cattle were on the plaintiff’s property. One
defendant, a state trooper, accompanied the veterinarian to
the plaintiff’s farm and investigated the condition of the
animals. The trooper filed a report with the county
prosecutor who obtained a warrant for the seizure of some
of the animals. The second defendant, also a state trooper,
assisted in executing the warrant under which the cattle
were seized by the local humane society which eventually
sold the animals to cover maintenance costs. As a result of
the second visit, another warrant was issued for seizure of
the remaining animals. The third defendant, a state trooper,
accompanied the humane society as it seized the animals.
The plaintiff was eventually exonerated of animal neglect
charges but by then all of the animals had been sold. The
plaintiff sued all parties, with the state troopers as the only
defendants in the current case. The plaintiff alleged that the
state troopers violated the plaintiff’s due process rights and
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court upheld
th  dismissal of the case against the troopers because the
troopers were properly executing court orders or were too
removed from the sale of the animals to have participated in
deprivation of the plaintiff’s property. Campbell v.
Chappelow, 95 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The debtor was a
family farm partnership which operated a grain and dairy
farm. Th  partners and their spouses also filed individual
bankruptcy cases which were consolidated with the debtor’s
cas . During the pendency of the debtor’s case, a seed
supplier sold on credit corn seed, fertilizer and two
herbicides to the debtor for producing one year’s crop. The
crop did not do well and the debtor complained to the
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supplier that the seed was defective and that the application
method for the fertilizer and herbicide was ineffective. The
supplier filed a priority administrative expense claim for the
seed and chemicals. The other creditors objected to the
claim, arguing that the estate was not benefited by the seeds
and chemicals because the farm was to be sold as soon as
possible. The court held that the seed and chemicals
benefited the estate by continuing to keep the farm
operational during the time it was offered for sale. The
debtor argued that the claim should not be allowed because
the seed and chemicals were defective. The court held that
the debtor failed to show that the seed or chemicals were
defective and that other intervening causes, such as low
moisture and poorly operating equipment, were not
responsible for the low yield. In re Molnar Bros., 200 B.R.
555 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1996).
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The court held that
the debtor’s earned income tax credit was not eligible for an
exemption under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(9)(e). In re
Beagle, 200 B.R. 595 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . The debtors had
owed money to the SBA. After that debt was due, the
debtors contracted with the ASCS (now CFSA) for
conservation programs under which the debtors would
receive annual deficiency payments. The SBA instituted an
administrative setoff which was properly approved by the
ASCS. Some payments were made within 90 days before
the debtors filed for bankruptcy and the trustee sought
recovery of the setoff payments as preferential transfers.
The court held that the ASCS and SBA lacked mutuality so
that the setoff was not binding in the bankruptcy case and
ordered recovery of the payments. Upon reconsideration, the
court held that the offset did not improve the SBA position;
therefore, the setoff was not subject to recovery. In re
Turner, 96 F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1996), on remand from 59
F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 1995).
TRUSTEE LIABILITY . The debtor had operated a
manufacturing business on real property and deposited
waste from the manufacturing process on the land,
contaminating the land and groundwater. The debtor filed
for Chapter 11 and a trustee was appointed. The trustee,
acting as trustee of the bankruptcy estate, transferred the
land to the plaintiff. The debtor falsely submitted a Negative
Declaration Affidavit with the state department of
environmental protection, stating that no areas of
environmental concern existed on the property. The sale was
closed but the plaintiff later learned of the contamination.
The plaintiff filed suit against all parties, including the
trustee. The court held that the trustee did not have a
fiduciary duty to the purchaser; therefore, the public policy
of protecting trustees from suits by nondebtors prevented
the trustee’s personal liability for the debtor’s misconduct.
Tennsco Corp. v. Estey Metal Products, Inc., 200 B.R.
542 (D. N.J. 1996).
   CHAPTER 13    -ALM § 13.03.*
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS OF TAXES .
The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan provided that all priority
claims were to be paid in full but that unsecured claims
would receive no payments. The IRS had filed a claim for
taxes which consisted of some priority taxes and some
unsecured general taxes. The debtors were entitled to a tax
refund from a pre-petition tax year and the IRS sought
permission to offset the refund against the tax claims, first
against the unsecured tax claim and then against the priority
ax cl i . The trustee testified that the plan would not
ucceed if the refund was applied first to the unsecured
taxes. The court held that it had the authority to exercise its
equitable powers to order the IRS to allocate the refund first
to the priority tax claim. In re Moore, 200 B.R. 687
(Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS . The debtors filed for Chapter 13 in
September 1995. The debtors filed a claim for 1995 taxes
for the IRS, arguing that the amount due for the first two
estimated tax installments were pre-petition taxes. The court
held that the 1995 taxes were not due until the end of the tax
year, December 31, 1995; therefore, the 1995 taxes were all
post-petition taxes. In re Michaelson, 200 B.R. 862
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1996).
DISMISSAL . The debtor’s Chapter 13 case was
dismissed for failure of the debtor to file all income tax
returns as ordered by the court. In re Vines, 96-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,603 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
INTEREST . The debtor filed for Chapter 11 and the
IRS filed an unsecured priority claim for employment taxes.
The debtor’s plan was confirmed in  August 1990, and in
February 1991, the IRS assessed additional unpaid post-
petition employment taxes. The debtor argued that the IRS
was not entitled to post-petition interest on the filed claim
and the post-petition assessment violated the automatic stay.
The court held that, because the IRS claim was not
discharged, post-petition interest continued to accrue. The
court also held that, because the plan did not provide for the
continuing of the automatic stay during the plan, the post-
confirmation assessment did not violate the automatic stay.
The cas  is designated as not for publication. In re Gehri,
96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,577 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1996).
POST-PETITION TAXES . The debtors filed for
Chapter 13 in September 1989 and the IRS filed claims for
unpaid taxes for 1985 through 1988. The debtors timely
filed their 1989 tax return and in June 1990 sought
permission to add the 1989 taxes to the Chapter 13 plan.
The IRS failed to object to this and filed amendments to its
claims for the other tax years. The debtors argued that the
1989 taxes were included in the discharge because of the
IRS failure to object and the IRS subsequent modification of
its claims. The court held that post-petition claim were
includible in the Chapter 13 plan only upon request of the
creditor; therefore, the 1989 taxes could not have been
included in the plan at the request of the debtors. Matter of
Epstein, 200 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
RETURNS. The debtor filed an income tax return for
the bankruptcy estate and then filed an amended return for
the estate. The debtor requested a prompt determination
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with only the amended return. The amended return was
accurate but failed to include the amount of taxable income
listed on the original return. The IRS failed to notify the
debtor that the return was selected for examination within
90 days after receiving the debtor’s request. The IRS argued
that an exception to that rule applied because the amended
return contained a material misrepresentation from the
failure to include the taxable income from the original
return. The court held that the omission of the original
taxable income was not a material misrepresentation;
therefore, the IRS was prohibited from challenging the
amended return. In re Grassgreen, 200 B.R. 696 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations changing the classification of New Mexico from
a Class A to a Class Free state. 61 Fed. Reg. 58625 (Nov.
18, 1996).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations which add specific provisions for sugar beets to
the Common Crop Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 58769
(Nov. 19, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which add
specific provisions for peaches to the Common Crop
Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 58786 (Nov. 19, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which add
specific provisions for dry beans to the Common Crop
Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 60049 (Nov. 26, 1996).
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued proposed regulations
establishing the 1997 national peanut poundage quota as
between 1,111.000 and 1,155,000 short tons and the
additional price support level of between $125 and $140 per
short ton. The minimum sales price for additional peanuts
for export edible use is to be between $375 and $425 per
short ton. 61 Fed. Reg. 59840 (Nov. 25, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS- ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed the entire estate, primarily the “home farm,” to
the surviving spouse and provided that if the surviving
spouse did not survive the decedent by at least 30 days, the
estate passed to a trust for the decedent’s child. The
surviving spouse disclaimed a portion of the estate that
represented a fraction of the home farm sufficient to
produce the smallest amount of assets in the estate which
would result in the lowest possible estate tax liability. In
other words, the disclaimed amount was to equal the amount
which would be offset by the unified and other credits
available to the estate. The disclaimed amounts passed
under the will provisions for a remainder interest in trust in
the decedent’s child. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
effective. Ltr. Rul. 9645010, Aug. 12, 1996.
GIFT- ALM  § 6.01.* The taxpayer owed taxes from
involvement in a business. The taxpayer transferred title to
the taxpayer’s residence to the taxpayer’s two minor
daughters under the Illinois Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act, reserving the right to live in the residence. The IRS
argued that the gift lacked donative intent and transferred
only bare legal title; therefore the residence remained
av ilable for attachment for payment of the taxpayer’s taxes.
The taxpayer argued that the transfer was bona fide because
it complied with state law. The court held that summary
judgment for the taxpayer was improper at this point
b cause the IRS provided sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of a gift through transfer in compliance with
the Illinois Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. United States
v. Melcher, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,578 (C.D. Ill.
1996).
GROSS ESTATE. The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust which provided that the trustees had the
discretion to distribute or accumulate trust income. At the
death of the beneficiaries, the trustor and the trustor’s
sp use, the trust terminated and trust corpus, except for
assets contributed by persons other than the trustor and the
trustor’s spouse, were to pass to the taxpayer’s children. The
trustor and spouse made two contributions in 1973, the
couple’s children made contributions in 1974 and 1975 and
the spouse’s estate was added to the trust in 1987. The IRS
ruled that the trust was includible in the trustor’s estate only
as to the property contributed by the trustor, based on the
ratio of the fair market value of the contribution to the fair
market value of the trust corpus at the time of the
contribution, adjusted by the fair market value of later
contributions by others. The IRS also ruled that the trust
corpus was subject to GSTT only as to post-1985
contributions. Ltr. Rul. 9646021, Aug. 20, 1996.
The taxpayers, husband and wife each established an
irrevocable trust. The beneficiaries of the wife’s trust
incl ded the husband and their children. The beneficiaries of
the husband’s trust included only the children. The
taxpayers served as trustee of each other’s trusts but all
distribution powers were given to an independent co-trustee.
The children and the husband had the power to require
distribution of gift contributions to the trusts but not to
exceed 5 percent  of the trust corpus or $5,000. The
taxpayers had limited powers of appointment over trust
corpus. The IRS ruled that the only portion of the trusts
included in the taxpayers’ estates was the value of the
husband’s corpus withdrawal rights at the time of death.
Ltr. Rul. 9643013, July 19, 1996.
MARITAL DEDUCTION- ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s estate included an interest in a trust which passed
to the surviving children. The residue of the estate passed to
the surviving spouse and the estate claimed a marital
deduction for the value of the entire residue, without any
reduction for the residue’s share of inheritance and estate
taxes. The decedent’s will provided language in three
provisi ns for payment of inheritance and estate taxes from
the state other than the residue portion passing to the
surviving spouse. Under the Ohio apportionment statute,
taxes were not to be paid from bequests for which a marital
deduction was available, unless the decedent’s will
expressly assigned the taxes to specific bequests. The court
ound that the will and trust provisions were ambiguous in
that th  provisions could have been interpreted to include
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the marital bequest as a source of payment of the taxes. The
court held, therefore, that the decedent’s will did not
expressly assign the taxes to all bequests and the
apportionment statute applied to prohibit apportionment of
the estate and inheritance taxes to the residue bequest which
was eligible for the marital deduction. The court
acknowledged rulings in the state probate court that agreed
with this interpretation of the will, although the court was
not bound by that ruling. Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 96-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,248 (6th Cir. 1996), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1993-149.
The decedent had established an inter vivos trust which
would continue for the surviving spouse at the decedent’s
death. The trust provided for distribution of all trust income
to the surviving spouse, except during any period of
incompetency. During the incompetency period, the trustee
was to hold trust income in another trust for distribution to
the spouse upon regaining competency. If the spouse died
before regaining competency, the accumulated income
passed to the remainder holders. The IRS ruled that the trust
was not eligible for the marital deduction because the
surviving spouse was not entitled to all trust income in all
events. Ltr. Rul. 9645006, July 24, 1996.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION- ALM § 5.03[2].* On the
death of the decedent in 1983, the estate made the special
use valuation election for farmland and the qualified heirs
signed and filed the agreement to the election and to be
liable for any recapture tax. Later, the IRS discovered that
some of the land was rented for cash to third parties. The
IRS issued a deficiency notice for recapture of the special
use valuation benefits relating to the cash rented land. The
heirs argued that the initial election was invalid and that the
IRS had notice of the invalidity from the date of the election
because the heirs included cash rent income on the estate’s
Schedule F of the income tax return. Therefore, the statute
of limitations had expired as to the election. The court held
that, because some of the estate’s farmland was not included
in the special use valuation election, the IRS could have
reasonably assumed that the cash rents came from that land
and not the special use valued land. In addition, the court
held that the heirs were under a duty to file consistent
returns and could not now claim a prior election as invalid
when the heirs had acted for several years as if the election
was valid. LeFever v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,250 (10th Cir. 1996), aff’g103 T.C. 525 (1994).
TAX LIEN . The taxpayer was a decedent’s estate. The
decedent had bequeathed a portion of real property to a third
party. The IRS had filed a tax lien for taxes owed by the
third party and the lien was a cloud on the title to the
property which the estate wanted to sell. The third party
disclaimed any interest in the estate and the estate argued
that the disclaimer had the effect of removing any interest of
the third party in the property to which a lien could attach.
The court held that under Texas law, a decedent’s estate
property immediately vested in the named heirs and that this
vesting was sufficient interest in the property for the lien to
attach. The disclaimer was not effective under federal law to
remove the lien. Estate of Leggett v. United States, 96-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,249 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
VALUATION . The taxpayer owned a residence on 16.6
acres of beach property. The entire property had been used
as a residence for 40 years and was not suitable for division.
The taxpayer transferred the property to a six-year trust with
the taxpayer as the sole income beneficiary. The trust could
sell the property but was required to either purchase a
replacement residence or distribute the corpus at the sooner
of the trust termination or two years after the sale. The trust
also provided that the trust corpus could not be sold directly
or indirectly to the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse. The
trust also had the power to hold cash for the maintenance
and improvement of the property. If the taxpayer died
before the trust terminated, the trust corpus was to be
distributed according to a power of appointment held by the
taxpayer; otherwise, the trust corpus passed upon
termination to the taxpayer’s children. The IRS ruled that
the trust was a qualified personal residence trust. Ltr. Rul.
9645010, Aug. 2, 1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer had invested in real
property for the purpose of developing the land for
residential construction.  As part of that plan, the taxpayer
loaned money to a third party. The investment did not bear
fruit and the third party filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
taxpayer claimed the unpaid loan as a business bad debt
deduction. The court held that the taxpayer’s involvement in
the real estate investment was not a trade or business;
therefore, the bad debt did not qualify as a business bad
debt. The court also held that, because the Chapter 7 estate
held assets for distribution to creditors, the taxpayer’s debt
was not wholly worthless and was not entitled to a bad debt
deduction. Scagliotta v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-498.
The taxpayers owned a roofing company and personally
guaranteed a line of credit for the company in order for the
company to acquire supplies for a roofing job. The company
failed to receive payment for that job, however, and was
liquidated. The taxpayers claimed the guaranteed debt as a
business bad debt deduction. The court allowed the business
bad debt deduction because the taxpayers made the
guarantee in order to protect their income from the business
and not to protect their investment in the company.
Rosenberg v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,583 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The
taxpayers received a judgment award in a negligence action.
The award included prejudgment interest equal to 39
percent of the total award. While the case was on appeal, the
parties settled for a specific amount, but the settlement did
not include a specific apportionment for prejudgment
interest. The IRS apportioned 39 percent of the settlement to
prejudgment interest and assessed income tax as to that
amount. The court upheld the IRS assessment because the
taxpayers failed to provide evidence that the settlement
intended a different apportionment. The prejudgment
interest was taxable because it was not part of the damages
awarded for personal injury. Delaney v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,576 (1st Cir. 1996).
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers were employed as
registered nurses and also operated a medical records review
service. The taxpayers purchased up to 10 Paso Fino horses
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with the intent to breed them for sale to the public. The
breeding business produced several years of increasing costs
and tax losses which offset their substantial wages. The
court looked at the nine factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)
to determine that the breeding business was not operated
with the intent to make a profit: (1) the taxpayers failed to
formulate a plan to produce a profit from the business; (2)
although the taxpayers had knowledge about the horses, the
taxpayers failed to obtain expert advice about running a
profitable breeding business; (3) the taxpayer expended
sufficient time in the business; (4) the appreciation of the
horses had no potential to offset the losses; (5) the taxpayer
had not successfully operated a similar business before; (6)
the business had a history of only losses; (7) the amount of
income from the business was insubstantial in comparison
to the losses; (8) the taxpayers’ other income was sufficient
to maintain their standard of living while absorbing the
losses; and (9) the taxpayers worked hard at the business but
also received much personal pleasure from rural life and
riding the horses. Thus, the taxpayer’s deductions from the
business expenses were limited to the income from the
business. Yates v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-499.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION. The taxpayer was a
limited partnership which formed a general partnership with
a corporation for the purpose of purchasing real property.
The property became the subject of governmental
condemnation proceedings and an agreement to sell the
property to the governmental entity was reached by the
general partnership. Once the sale was assured and
imminent, the general partnership transferred 50 percent
tenant-in-common interests to the taxpayer and the
corporation. The taxpayer used the proceeds of the sale to
purchase similar property and sought allowance of like-kind
tax-free transfer treatment for the sale and purchase. The
IRS ruled that the sale of the original property was made by
the general partnership and not by the taxpayer; therefore,
the purchase of other property by the taxpayer did not
qualify for like-kind exchange treatment. Ltr. Rul.
9645005, July 23, 1996.
LEVY. The IRS has issued a table for determining the
amount of wages, salary or other income exempt from levy
for 1997. Notice. 96-56, I.R.B. 1996-47, 7.
The defendant hired the taxpayer to perform
subcontracting services. The taxpayer had assigned its
accounts receivable to a bank as security for a loan. On July
7, 1992, the IRS filed a tax levy on the defendant for taxes
owed by the taxpayer. The bank notified the defendant of
the assignment on July 9, 1992. The court held that the
defendant was liable for the failure to pay the amount owed
on the tax levy because the levy was filed prior to
notification of the assignment. United States v. Giffels
Associates, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,584 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
PENALTIES. The taxpayers were assessed additional
taxes after an audit of their 1985-1986 returns. The
taxpayers operated a substantial feedlot business with
annual revenues over $6 million. In the audit, the IRS
imposed a FIFO inventory system because the taxpayers had
inadequate inventory records. The taxpayers were also
found to have improperly reported an interest expense in the
tax year before the interest was actually charged. The IRS
disallowed a dependent deduction for the taxpayers’
daughter for the tax year the daughter was married, because
th  daughter and new husband filed a joint return. Finally,
the taxpayers improperly claimed a business deduction for
the use of three head of cattle to feed the taxpayers and their
workers. The IRS assessed a penalty for substantial
u derpayment of taxes and the taxpayers sought a waiver of
t at penalty for acting in good faith. The court held that the
pe alty was justified for all but the interest deduction,
because the taxpayers had relied on a bank statement that
the inter st was charged in the year for which the deduction
was claim d.  Walter v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,604 (D. S.D. 1996).
The IRS has issued proposed regulations concerning the
reasonable basis standard for avoiding the accuracy-related,
negligence, and substantial understatement of income
penalties. Under the final regulations currently in place, the
reasonable basis standard is ``significantly higher than the
not frivolous standard applicable to preparers under 6694.''
The proposed regulations provide that the reasonable basis
standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely
arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. A return
position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard
if it s reasonably based on one or more of the authorities set
forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). The proposed
egula ions also clarify that if a return position does not
satisfy  reasonable basis standard, the reasonable cause
and good faith exception as set forth in Treas. Reg. §
1.6664-4 may still provide relief from the penalty. 61 Fed.
Reg. 58020 (Nov. 12, 1996).
The taxpayer was a corporation which had timely paid
its taxes for 1983 but had obtained the automatic extension
to file. When the taxpayer finally filed the 1983 return, the
taxpayer claimed a refund because the timely tax payment
exceeded the actual amount due. The taxpayer elected to
apply the refund amount to the 1984 tax liability. However,
upon review by the IRS, the 1983 refund amount was
reduced. The IRS charged the taxpayer for interest on the
excess refund claimed by the taxpayer from the date of the
1983 return. The IRS argued that once the refund was
applied to the 1984 tax year, any deficiency would carry
back to the 1983 return. The taxpayer argued that the 1983
taxes were fully paid and that the interest could not be
charged until 1984 taxes were due but unpaid. The court
held that the “use of money” principle applied to determine
when interest on taxes begins to accrue. Because the
taxpayer had no benefit from the erroneous refund claim
until taxes became due in 1984, no interest could be charged
until those taxes became due. The May Department Stores
Co. v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,596
(Fed. Cl. 1996).
The IRS had determined that the taxpayer corporation
had overpaid its 1981 tax but owed additional taxes for 1982
and 1983. The amount of the overpayments exceeded both
of the deficiencies. The IRS paid interest on the entire 1981
overpayment until the due date of the return for 1982. The
IRS then paid interest on the remaining overpayment until
the due date for the 1983 return. The IRS then paid interest
on the remaining overpayment until the date of repayment.
For 1986, the taxpayer timely filed its return and claimed an
overpayment of taxes. The taxpayer elected to apply the
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overpayment to the 1987 taxes but did not designate as to
which estimated tax payment the overpayment was to be
applied. The IRS applied the overpayment to the first
estimated tax payment and assessed interest on a 1988
deficiency from the date of the first estimated payment
instead of the due date of the return. Ltr. Rul. 9646001,
June 20, 1996.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in November
1996, the weighted average is 6.91 percent with the
permissible range of 6.22 to 7.46 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.22 to 7.60 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
59, I.R.B. 1996-__, __.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 1996
Annual Semi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.75 5.67 5.63 5.60
110% AFR 6.34 6.24 6.19 6.16
120% AFR 6.92 6.80 6.74 6.71
Mid-term
AFR 6.31 6.21 6.16 6.13
110% AFR 6.95 6.83 6.77 6.73
120% AFR 7.59 7.45 7.38 7.34
Long-term
AFR 6.77 6.66 6.61 6.57
110% AFR 7.46 7.33 7.26 7.22
120% AFR 8.15 7.99 7.91 7.86
SALE OF ASSETS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder, chief executive officer and director of a
corporation which manufactured paint sprayers. The
taxpayer owned several horses which the taxpayer wanted to
sell. The taxpayer had title to the horses secretly transferred
to a new subsidiary of the corporation. The purpose of the
transfer was to have the corporation sell the horses and
recognize any gain which would be eligible for offset by net
operating loss carryforwards held by the corporation. The
management of the horses did not change after the transfer
and other directors and employees of the corporation were
not informed about the horse transfer and sales. The court
held that the taxpayer was required to recognize any gain
from the sale of the horses because the corporation was
merely a conduit for the sale. The court noted that the
transfer of the horses to the corporation served no business
purpose of the corporation and was made primarily for tax
advantages. Estate of Kluener v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-519.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer established a trust to be funded
with S corporation stock. The trust provided that the trustee
had the power to lend money from the trust to the taxpayer
without providing security for the loan. The trustee could
irrevocably release or waive this power. The taxpayer had
the power to acquire trust property by substituting property
of equivalent value. The IRS ruled that the trust was a
grantor trust such that the taxpayer was liable for any tax on
trust income. Ltr. Rul. 9645013, Aug. 9, 1996.
The taxpayer was the owner of a grantor trust which had
income from the renting of safe deposit boxes. The trust
filed a “1041 Supplement” showing income of $87,519 but
the taxpayer reported income from the trust of only $74,955,
claiming that the taxpayer was entitled to more depreciation
th n was claimed by the trust. The court found that the trust
was a grantor trust; therefore, the income and deductions
from the rental of the safe deposit boxes was treated as if the
boxes were owned by the taxpayer. The additional
depreciation was not allowed because the taxpayer failed to
provide evidence of the basis of the boxes  for determining
the appropriate depreciation. Bresnahan v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-497.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
ON THE WEB
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
Check out our internet site for information about:
• Agricultural Law Manual, by Neil E. Harl, a
comprehensive, annotated looseleaf deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law,  college textbook, by
Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, due for publication in
December 1996.
• Seminar in Paradise, “Farm Estate and Business
Planning,” by Neil E. Harl in Hawaii, January 6-10, 1997.
• Direct internet links to legal resources on the internet.
• Direct email link to the Agricultural Law Press.
We welcome any suggestions for improving our web
it .
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
L w Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 50703
EUGENE, OR 97405
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Time is running out to take advantage of this special seminar,
register now to insure your reservation
  SEMINAR IN PARADISE   
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 1997
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1997! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 6-10, 1997 at the
beautiful ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big
Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
  • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
  • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
discount air fares on United Airlines and discounts on
hotel rooms at the Royal Waikoloan, the site of the
seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
For a registration packet, please call Robert Achenbach
at 1-541-302-1958.
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